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ABSTRACT: 
This Article argues for the reform of judicial accountability rules in 
Egypt. The lack of a real separation of powers and “checks and balances” 
between the three powers often leads the judiciary to become 
a periphery in the executive body, rather than an independent authority 
that invigilates and monitors any violation of the law. Judges who refuse 
to comply with executive wishes are often subjected to persecution from 
the Ministry of Justice and its Judicial Inspection Department, which can 
reach up to the level of impeachment. The Ministry of Justice uses judicial 
accountability as a tool of retribution over disobedient and inconsistent 
judges. Currently, the executive authority monopolizes the judicial 
accountability process and its outcomes. Reformation towards a 
transparent democratic judiciary requires major participation by the public 
in the judicial accountability process. This participation aims not only to 
exclude the authority of the Ministry of Justice over the judiciary and the 
judges, but it also aims to increase public participation in a democratic 
judiciary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judicial reform ensures full protection of individuals’ rights.1 The 
judiciary is the last resort against outrageous aggression by the executive 
                                                     
 1. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Constitutional Reform and Individual Freedoms, 8 W. ONTARIO L. 
REV. 1, 1–2 (1969); see also Edward Gurney, Toward Judicial Reform, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 83, 83 
(1971). 
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authority against citizens’ rights.2 In this respect, the lack of an 
independent and accountable judiciary is a hindrance. Independence and 
accountability are two indispensable factors required for judicial reform. 
They both form the core of solemn judicial reform.3 Furthermore, the lack 
of judicial accountability and independence could potentially jeopardize 
human rights and liberties.4 For example, interference by the Minister of 
Justice in judicial decision-making compromises judicial independence.5 
On the other hand, a complete lack of judicial oversight and accountability 
could have the opposite effect—resulting in judicial corruption.6 Hence, 
this Article argues for reform of the judicial accountability process. 
The topic of judicial accountability raises three main questions. Who 
is accountable? To whom? And for what? In a democratic system, the 
answer to the first question, “who is accountable,” is the judiciary, either 
institutionally or as judges individually.7 This Article, however, chooses 
not to address that question for two reasons. First, the definition of the 
judiciary is rather vague in Egypt.8 This ambiguity stems from nonjudicial 
bodies being judicial in nature, such as the Administrative Prosecution 
Office (APO),9 the Public Prosecution Office (PPO),10 the military 
                                                     
 2. See George Wickersham, Judicial Function, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 604 (1912). 
 3. See Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State 
Courts, 61 LAW CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 79–80 (1998); Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: 
Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L REV. 625, 635 (1999); see also Hiram Chodosh, 
Reforming Judicial Reform Inspired by U.S. Models, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 351, 365 (2002). 
 4. Shayonee Dasgupta & Sakshi Agarwal, Judicial Accountability and Independence: Exploring 
the Limits of Judicial Power, 2 NUJS L. REV. 779, 779–80 (2009). 
 5. See Judicial Councils Reforms for an Independent Judiciary. Examples from Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco and Palestine, INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RIGHTS 7 (May 2009), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a83c4420.html. 
 6. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 104, 104–05 (2009). 
 7. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC. 38, 46 (2000). 
 8. Ali Mokhtar, An Egyptian Judicial Perspective, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 779, 779–80 (2003). 
 9. Article 197 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic states: 
The Administrative Prosecution is an independent judicial body. It investigates financial 
and administrative irregularities, and those referred to it. Regarding these irregularities, it 
has the authorities vested in the administration body to inflict disciplinary penalties. 
Challenging its decisions takes place before the competent disciplinary court at the State 
Council. It also initiates and conducts proceedings and disciplinary appeals before the State 
Council courts in accordance with the law. All the foregoing is organized by law. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 197. 
 10. Id. art. 189 (“The public prosecution is an integral part of the judiciary. It is responsible for 
investigating, pressing charges and prosecuting all criminal cases except what is exempted by law. 
The law establishes the public prosecution’s other competencies.”). 
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judiciary,11 the State Case Authority (SCA),12 as well as the delegates in 
the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC).13 Second, the judiciary is the 
competent authority for holding its members accountable.14 It is not clear, 
however, who has the right to hold the institution accountable for its 
actions.15 This approach needs reform.16 
The answer to the second question, “to whom is the judiciary 
accountable,” is debatable. There are three general bodies to whom the 
judiciary can be held accountable. First, the judiciary can be held 
accountable directly to the public.17 This system is based on judicial 
appointment through elections.18 The public is considered the cornerstone 
of judicial independence because it is the source of judicial power and 
judicial accountability—it has the power to eliminate judges through 
elections.19 Second, the judiciary can be held accountable to executive 
authorities (authoritarian or monarchical regimes),20 legislative authorities 
                                                     
 11. Id. art. 204 (“The Military Judiciary is an independent judiciary that adjudicates exclusively 
in all crimes related to the armed forces, its officers, personnel, and their equals, and in the crimes 
committed by general intelligence personnel during and because of the service.”). 
 12. Id. art. 196 (“The State Cases Authority is an independent judicial body. It undertakes the 
legal representation of the state in lawsuits and disputes to which the state is party. It may propose 
settling of disputes at any stage of litigation in accordance with the law. It also conducts technical 
supervision the cases undertaken by the departments of legal affairs at the state’s administrative body. 
It authors the draft contracts referred to it by administrative bodies and to which the state is party. The 
foregoing is organized by law.”). 
 13. Id. art. 194 (“The President and the vice-presidents of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and 
the head and members of its Commissioners Authority are independent, cannot be dismissed, and are 
subject to no other authority but the law. The law sets out the conditions that they must meet. The 
Court is responsible for their disciplinary accountability as set out by law. They are entitled to all the 
rights, duties and guarantees granted to other members of the judiciary.”). 
 14. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 186. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, A Call for Judicial Reform in Egypt, 11 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. 
L. 256, 256–59 (2017).  
 17. See Roger Handberg, Judicial Accountability and Independence: Balancing Incompatibles, 
49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 131 (1995); Maartje De Visser, Judicial Accountability and New 
Governance, 37 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 41, 59 (2010); see also Stephen Burbank, 
Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 912 
(2007). 
 18. See Harlod Laski, Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 529, 530 (1926); 
J.E. Penner, Common Law Cognition and Judicial Appointment, 38 ALTA. L. REV. 683, 702 (2001); 
see also Stephanie Seymour, Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 
691, 695 (2004). 
 19. William P. Marshall, Judicial Accountability in a Time of Legal Realism, 56 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 937, 937–38 (2006). 
 20. See Michael Traynor, Judicial Independence: A Cornerstone of Liberty, 37 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 487, 493 (2007); see also Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The 
Independence of the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 31–32 (2000). 
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(the U.S. example),21 or both (the German example).22 These methods 
ensure the principle of checks and balances between the judiciary on the 
one side and the executive and legislative authorities on the other.23 Third, 
the judiciary can be accountable to itself. This is an unconventional 
method that the Egyptian judiciary employs, and it is reflected in its 
Constitution.24 
As for the third question of “what holds a judge accountable,” there 
are three types of actions that judges are held accountable for: disciplinary, 
political, and legal actions.25 In terms of disciplinary actions, Egypt’s 
Constitution grants each judicial institution the right to oversee 
disciplinary procedures involving its own members.26 In theory, the 
executive and the legislative authorities do not have any right to participate 
in such a process.27 In practice, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and its 
Judicial Inspection Department (JID) are the competent authorities that 
initiate disciplinary procedures against judges, prosecutors, and members 
of other judicial institutions.28 This incongruity is because the Minister of 
Justice and JID members are judges, who are selected with the approval 
of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC).29 
In the United States, the judiciary is part of the political process.30 
This is because U.S. judges are either politically affiliated or they run for 
                                                     
 21. See Marjorie Cohn, Open-and-Shut: Senate Impeachment Deliberation Must Be Public, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 365, 377 (2000); Francis Kieran, Dueling with Dworkin: Political Morality in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 6 U. C. DUBLIN L. REV. 30, 30 (2006). 
 22. See David Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: 
Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1832–44 (1988); Jörg Philipp Terhechte, 
Judicial Accountability and Public Liability—The German “Judges Privilege” Under the Influence of 
European and International Law, 13 GERMAN L. J. 313, 317 (2012). 
 23. See J. Denny Moffett, The Birth of the United States Constitution: June 15, 1215, 11 TULSA 
L. J. 504, 508 (1976). 
 24. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 186 (“Judges are 
independent, cannot be dismissed, are subject to no other authority but the law, and are equal in rights 
and duties. The conditions and procedures for their appointment, secondment, delegation and 
retirement are regulated by the law. It also regulates their disciplinary accountability.”). 
 25. NATHAN BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS 
AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 143–46 (2002). 
 26. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 186. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 73 
(Egypt). 
 29. With respect to the Minister of Justice, see Saher Aziz, Independence Without 
Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt’s Failed Transition to Democracy, 120 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 669, 702 (2016). 
 30. See Evan Barret, Representation Reinforcement Revisited: Citizens United and Political 
Process Theory, 38 VT. L. REV. 445, 476 (2014); Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the 
Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 95–96 (2002); see also Michael Klarman, The Puzzling 
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 814 (1991). 
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election.31 They are permitted to participate in the political process, 
regardless of whether they are state or federal judges.32 This is due to the 
role played by politics and the public in the judicial independence process, 
and its accountability and appointment processes.33 In Egypt, the Judicial 
Authority Law (JAL) bans judges and the court from declaring their 
political affiliation.34 The law does not, however, specify a disciplinary 
action for violating this ban.35 This opens the door to arbitrary punishments 
for judges, as shown in the following sections. This is due to the lack of 
integration in the political process, and as a result, judges have been forced 
to participate in politics. 
In terms of legal violations, it is widely accepted that judges enjoy a 
limited amount of immunity from civil procedures that result from their 
work as judges.36 There is disagreement regarding criminal immunity of 
judges for crimes committed during court sessions,37 but there is 
widespread consensus that judges are not immune from civil and criminal 
liability for actions committed in their personal lives.38 However, the 
Constitution and the JAL provide judicial immunity for all judicial 
institutions, including the SCC and the ordinary and administrative 
judiciary.39 In the event of having committed a crime, judges will not be 
arrested or held on remand unless the SJC issues a warrant for their 
arrest.40 The SJC has the right to issue an arrest against any judge, if 
members of the council ascertain that a judge has committed a criminal 
violation. 41The SJC is the competent authority that decides whether a 
judge should be remanded in custody or released on bail.42  
                                                     
 31. See Frank Macchiarola, The Courts in the Political Process: Judicial Activism or Timid Local 
Government?, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 703, 706 (1994); see also Isaiah Baker, Of Bench, 
Bar and Bosses: The Political Process of Judicial Reform, 21 HOWARD L.J. 821, 830 (1978). 
 32. Richard Schauffler, Judicial Accountability in the US State Courts: Measuring Court 
Performance, 3 UTRECHT L. REV. 112, 112–15 (2007). 
 33. Andrea McArdle, The Increasingly Fractious Politics of Nonpartisan Judicial Selection: 
Accountability Challenges to Merit-Based Reform, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1799, 1801–02 (2012). 
 34. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 73/1 
(Egypt). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. art. 73/2 (“Courts are prohibited from giving political opinion. Judges are also prohibited 
from political participation. They cannot run for the election of public assembly, regional institutions 
or political organization, unless they have submitted their resignation.”). 
 37. Antoine Garapon & Harold Epinuse, Judicial Independence in France, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 290 (Anja Seibert-Fohr eds., 2012). 
 38. Id. 
 39. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 186. 
 40. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 96 
(Egypt). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. art. 97. 
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Moreover, judicial accountability triggers the question of the 
separation of powers between judges and the Judicial Accountability 
Power, which has the right to hold the judiciary accountable.43 Although 
most universal jurisdictions, like the United States and Germany, separate 
clearly between powers, the Egyptian judiciary unifies them.44 The 
absence of a separation of powers and a checks and balances system makes 
it difficult to understand the accountability of the judiciary.45 The Minister 
of Justice in Egypt enjoys a mixed role, based on both his judicial and 
executive functions.46 On an executive level, the Minister of Justice is part 
of the Cabinet.47 The President of the Republic appoints the Minister of 
Justice from the ordinary judiciary upon consultation with the Prime 
Minister.48 As for the judicial aspect of the MoJ, this is based on the nature 
of the Minister of Justice and its senior officials, who work in the ministry. 
All senior officials are judges, whose work is performed on a time-bound 
secondment,49 basis granted by their respective courts to the MoJ.50 In 
other words, the executive authority uses members of the judiciary as a 
tool for retribution against dissentient judges.51 Hence, the unification 
between the judiciary and its Judicial Accountability Power gives rise to 
many questions that this Article endeavors to address. 
This Article aims, first, to prove that the current rules of 
accountability are inadequate and lead to partiality and subjectivity against 
judges in Egypt. Due to the scarcity of literature on this topic, related 
research is based on the testimony of several members of the judiciary that 
                                                     
 43. Id. 
 44. The judiciary is responsible for the impeachment of its members. CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 186. 
 45. See Aziz, supra note 29, at 670. 
 46. Id. 
 47. The term “sovereign ministries” includes the Ministry of Defense. The appointment of this 
minister is taken directly from the President of the Republic. “The Minister of Defense is appointed 
upon the approval of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The provisions of this article shall 
remain in force for two full presidential terms starting from the date on which this Constitution comes 
into effect.” CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 234. 
 48. Id. 
 49. “Secondment” is “the detachment of a person (such as a [judge or] military officer) from his 
or her regular organization for temporary assignment elsewhere.” Definition of Secondment, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2017), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/secondment [https:// 
perma.cc/3G75-2F8G]. 
 50. Egypt’s Judiciary: A Tool of Repression, INT’L COMMISSION OF JURISTS 10 (2016), 
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Egypt-Tool-of-repression-Publications-Reports-
Thematic-reports-2016-ENG-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PUS-GVWD]. 
 51. See Philippe Schmitter, Political Accountability in ‘Real Existing’ Democracies: Meaning 
and Mechanisms, EUROPEAN U. INST. 2 (Jan. 2007), http://www.eui.eu/Documents/ 
DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/PCSPoliticalAccountabilityJan07.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2Z9T-FB9Y]; see also Ruth Grant & Robert Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 30 (2005). 
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was later made public. Second, this research aims to propose a reform for 
the dilemma of judicial accountability. The solution lies in both reforming 
the rules and the authority of accountability. The rules lack transparency 
and clarity, and open the door for the executive authority to violate judicial 
independence. The authority of accountability, which includes the MoJ 
and the SJC, lack any form of democratic formulation. Consequently, the 
rule of accountability needs to be addressed. 
This Article consists of three sections. The first tackles the current 
legal process of judicial accountability in Egypt, including complaints, 
proceedings, and disciplinary actions. It also deals with the question of the 
separation of powers regarding judicial accountability. The second section 
of this Article proposes reforming judicial accountability considering the 
contemporary challenges facing Egypt. Finally, this Article proposes 
several reformations to the judicial accountability rules in Egypt. These 
reformations ensure public participation in both judicial independence and 
accountability. 
I. THE JUDICIAL MASSACRES OF 1969 AND 2016 
The first Massacre of Judges occurred during the presidency of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser.52 Nasser’s policy solicited inappropriate 
interference in judicial affairs.53 Between 1964 and 1969, Nasser enticed 
judges to join the Arab Socialist Union.54 His successive attempts failed 
when judges turned down his offer.55 The judges insisted that joining the 
Union would affect their independence and impartiality.56 In response to 
their refusal, Nasser established a group of loyal judges to eavesdrop on 
their colleagues.57 This group of loyal judges formed a secret organization 
known as “Tanziem Sarie al-Tali’i” (Tanziem).58 Membership of Tanziem 
consisted of several judges who held leading positions in the MoJ and the 
                                                     
 52. HAMIED ANSARI, EGYPT THE STALLED SOCIETY, 140–50 (1986).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyed, The Judicial Authority and Civil Society, in JUDGES AND 
POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT 227, 230 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron ed., 2008). 
 55. Ahmed Mansour, Tanziem Sarie le-Jamal Abdel Nasser Dakhal al-Qada, SHOROUK NEWS 
(May 22, 2013), http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=22052013&id=c5a4f197-
1c5a-4b50-b7e7-87cd25ca435a [https://perma.cc/RT2A-PW6R]. 
 56. AMR SHALAKANY, IZDIHĀR WA-INHIYĀR AL-NUKHBA AL-QĀNŪNIYYA AL-MIṢRIYYA 230 
(2013). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Atef Shahat Said, The Role of the Judges Club in Enhancing the Independence of the 
Judiciary and Spurring Political Reform, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT 111, 112, 230 
(Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron ed. 2008). 
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PPO.59 As a result, this caused a growing sense of outrage among judges 
and prosecutors.60 
The Judges’ Club (Club) provided an arena in which to condemn the 
government’s solicitation of judges to join the Socialist Union, and also 
provided a social venue for judges and prosecutors.61 Nasser’s regime was 
unable to impose its rule over the Club. Nasser regarded the Club as the 
face of opposition and a threat, especially when Tanziem failed to secure 
any seats on the Club board.62 Repeated failure led to more antagonism 
against the judiciary.63 Nasser took two steps to put an end to the resistance 
from the judiciary.64 First, he issued a law that dissolved the Club board.65 
He appointed all the members of the Club’s board, instead of elected 
members.66 Second, he issued Law Number 83 of 1969, dissolving all 
judicial bodies and reserving for himself the right to reappoint all judges.67 
In this reappointment process, he excluded at least 200 judges whom he 
considered a threat.68 The consequences of this law were not addressed 
until the al-Sadat era in 1972.69 
 The Court of Cassation determined that Nasser’s law violated both 
the Constitution and the Judicial Authority Law (JAL).70 
The inability of the SJC to face the interference of the executive in the 
judiciary leads to the establishment of informal organizations among 
judges.71 The role of these organizations is to unify the judges against the 
executive and its allied Tanziem judges.72 These organizations are the 
Independent Judicial Movement, Qoda’ al-Istqlal (IJM), and the Judges 
for Egypt, known as Qoda’ men-ajl-Misr (JFE).73  
                                                     
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. SHALAKANY, supra note 56, at 113. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Law No. 84 of 1969 (Judges’ Club), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah (al-Jumḥūrīyah al-ʻArabīyah 
al-Muttaḥidah [United Arab Republic]), 31 Aug. 1969 (Egypt). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Law No. 83 of 1969 (Reformulation of Judicial Institutions Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah 
(al-Jumḥūrīyah al-ʻArabīyah al-Muttaḥidah [United Arab Republic]), 31 Aug. 1969 (Egypt). 
 68. GABRIEL ABRAHAM ALMOND, COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY: A WORLD VIEW, 588 
(2000).  
 69. Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, The Egyptian Judiciary in the Age of the Republic: The Role of 
Internal Conflicts in Controlling the Judicial System, 4 INDON. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 364, 395 (2017). 
 70. Maḥkamat al-Naqḍ [Court of Cassation], session of 21 Dec. 1972, year 32. 
 71. These organizations are informal because first, they have no legal status, and second, not all 
judges are members of such organizations. 
 72. Ahmed Mansour, Al-Tanziem al-Sarie leJamal Abdel Nasser Dakhal al-Qada, SHOROUK 
NEWS (May 22, 2013), http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=22052013&id= 
c5a4f197-1c5a-4b50-b7e7-87cd25ca435a [https://perma.cc/H4X7-DHBT]. 
 73. Id. 
70 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1 
The first informal organization is the IJM, which was established 
after the judicial massacre in 1969.74 From 1970 to 2010, many judges 
formed the IJM.75 They organized secret meetings to support judicial 
reform.76 The leading figures of this movement were Judge Hossam 
Gheriani,77 Ahmed Mekki,78 and Hisham Genenia.79 They were, however, 
unable to enforce any judicial reform, and the government blacklisted 
them.80 After the January 25th Revolution, Gheriani, Mekki, and Genenia 
were appointed to high-ranking judicial and political positions.81 
The second informal organization is the JFE, which suffered the 
second Massacre of Judges.82 This organization was established after the 
January 25th Revolution.83 There are allegations that the JFE is connected 
to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).84 Waled Sharabi, one of the JFE leaders, 
was photographed leaving the MB headquarters.85 After ousting ex-
President Mohamed Morsi, Waled Sharabi was impeached.86 JFE also 
made several statements,87 including their famous position after the 
military coup when they signed a document condemning it.88 They also 
                                                     
 74. SHALAKANY, supra note 56, at 10. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Judge Hossam Gheriani headed the Supreme Judicial Council from June 2011 to July 2012. 
He was appointed as the President of the Constitute Assembly in 2012. David Kipkpatrick, Egyptian 
Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/panel-drafting-egypts-constitution-prepares-
quick-vote.html. 
 78. Ahmed Mikky was the previous Minister of Justice in the Muslim Brotherhood Government 
of 2012. Sayed Gamaleddine, Egypt’s Justice Minister Ahmed Mekki Resigns: Judicial Sources, 
AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 21, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/69781/Egypt/ 
Politics-/BREAKING-Justice-minister-Ahmed-Mekki-resigns-Judi.aspx [https://perma.cc/WR49-
AYEG]. 
 79. Hasham Genenia served as president of the Central Auditing Organization from 2012 to 
2016. Khaled Hassam, Egypt’s Former Top Auditor Says His Trial is Political, AL MONITOR (June 
23, 2016), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/egypt-corruption-hisham-geneina-
sentence-interview.html [https://perma.cc/R74C-K94N]. 
 80. Al Hajjaji, supra note 69, at 395.  
 81. Supra note 77, 78 and 79.  
 82. More than fifty-five judges were impeached for writing a statement condemning the Military 
Coup. See Egypt: Arbitrary and Unfair Removal of Judges Must Be Reversed, INT’L COMMISSION OF 
JURISTS (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.icj.org/egypt-arbitrary-and-unfair-removal-of-judges-must-be-
reversed/ [https://perma.cc/3DHE-M8FK]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Sisi Forces 4 Judges into Retirement for Alleged Brotherhood Ties, MADA MASR (Feb. 18, 
2016), https://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/02/18/news/u/sisi-forces-4-judges-into-retirement-for-
alleged-brotherhood-ties/ [https://perma.cc/2892-X9Y2]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Shaima Rashied, Tadeb we-salahyat ya’zal alqadi walid Sharabi letadokholah fi alsyasa, 
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publicized the document in Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, the center of the 
sit-in of the MB following the coup.89 
The MoJ started pursuing JFE members for violating the JAL in 
relation to political participation—while leaving alone the judges who 
supported the Coup.90 The document that JFE members signed 
empathizing with MB members was considered proof of political 
participation.91 Their act was therefore a violation of the judicial law.92 
Resultantly, there is still an ongoing Second Massacre of Judges not yet 
fully completed.93 This has led to the urgent need to tackle the outstanding 
issue of judicial accountability in contemporary Egypt. 
II. ARBITRARINESS AND VAGUENESS OF JUDICIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY RULES IN EGYPT 
A. Judicial Accountability of Individual Judges 
1. Judicial Conduct 
Egypt’s Constitution grants an exclusive right to the judiciary to 
settle disputes related to its members.94 However, the Constitution lacks a 
clear prohibition against the MoJ or its delegates interfering in the judicial 
accountability process.95 Unlike the Constitution, the JAL mentions four 
types of conduct that judges and the judiciary are banned from exercising: 
political, criminal, disciplinary, and civil.96 
First, political accountability is the most controversial ban. The JAL 
does not specify any sanction for the violation of political participation. 
Political accountability is furthermore the only form of accountability that 
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addresses both judges and the judiciary.97 The collective responsibility of 
the judiciary is not a common issue, except when it comes to political 
responsibility. As a result, political accountability raises several questions 
related to the definition of political participation that judges and the 
judiciary are banned from engaging in.98 
Second, criminal accountability is organized contrary to the judicial 
immunity of prosecutors and judges, which includes investigative or 
criminal actions taken against them.99 Members of the judiciary, including 
PPO members, are not subject to arrest, search, or seizure.100 This ban also 
includes all forms of investigation, both felony and misdemeanor.101 There 
are two exceptions to this rule.102 First, both the JID and the SJC permit 
criminal procedures against a judge or prosecutor.103 The SJC has to issue 
an arrest warrant or authorize the process of investigation, such as search 
and seizure.104 Second, if a judge or prosecutor is caught engaging in 
illegal conduct, a judicial investigator or police officer can arrest the judge 
or prosecutor.105 In this case, the Attorney General must notify the SJC of 
the issue within twenty-four hours, and the SJC then decides whether to 
arrest the judge or release him on bail.106 This form of criminal 
accountability in the JAL leads to social and legal inequality for several 
reasons. 
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First, a judge who commits a crime is prosecuted and put on trial by 
his or her colleagues.107 In the United States, Congress is responsible for 
the impeachment process of federal judges.108 In Germany, the Bundestag, 
with a two-thirds majority, has the right to impeach a judge who violates 
the constitution in either official or unofficial capacity.109 However, judges 
in Egypt are the competent authority that impeach other judges.110 The 
Minister of Justice is a former judge,111 the members of the JID are judges 
and prosecutors on secondment, 112 and the SJC is formulated from senior 
judges.113 The impeachment authority of judges allows them to turn a blind 
eye on investigating certain crimes against senior judges.114 Hence, there 
is an assumption of nepotism when judges impeach their colleagues. 
Second, the special judicial committee is made up of senior judges.115 
This committee will convene only for serious crimes, such as murder, 
while less serious crimes are given less priority by the committee.116 This 
understanding leads the prosecution, for instance, to refrain from 
prosecuting judges for traffic law violations.117 As a result, there is a 
growing consensus among the public that judges are above the law. 
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Third, disciplinary accountability is yet another vague form of 
accountability after political accountability. The JAL also uses vague 
terms regarding disciplinary accountability. These terms include 
commercial work, work ethics, and integrity, among others.118 Judges 
must fulfill their obligations and comply with professional ethics.119 The 
JAL gives the President of the Court the right to respond to such violations 
committed by judges.120 Additionally, judges are banned from engaging in 
any commercial activities.121 However, the limits of commercial 
transactions are not clearly delineated in the JAL. 122 The JID does not 
demarcate what is considered commercial activity, and what is not, with a 
few exceptions. As a result, disciplinary accountability terms are vague 
and open the door to arbitrary proceedings. 
Fourth, there are two types of civil accountability. The first type of 
civil accountability is related to the judicial work of both judges and 
prosecutors.123 The general rule for this type of civil accountability is that 
judges are immune while their accountability is an exception, as will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs.124 The Civil Procedure Law (CPL) 
grants judges and prosecutors legal immunity from any civil damages that 
may arise from their work.125 Article 494 lists two exceptions to this 
rule.126First, judges and prosecutors are not immune from legal actions if 
they commit fraud, a hoax, treachery, or serious professional 
misconduct.127 Second, judges are not immune from civil liability, which 
occurs when a judge refuses to hear cases.128 
The second type of civil accountability applies to nonjudicial actions. 
In theory, judges should not derive any form of civil immunity from their 
                                                     
 118. These types of vague terms are used to impeach noncompliant judges, like in the 1969 and 
2016 judge massacres. For more on the massacre of 1969, see Sarah Wolff, Constraints on the 
Promotion of the Rule of Law in Egypt: Insights From the 2005 Judges’ Revolt, 16 DEMOCRATIZATION 
102 (2009). For more on the massacre of 2016, see Ahmed Abouelenein, How Egypt’s Crackdown on 
Dissent Ensnared Some of the Country’s Top Judges, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/egypt-judges/ [https://perma.cc/BSU5-EXFX]. 
 119. “Judges are also prohibited from doing any work against their independence or integrity.” 
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 October 1972, art. 2 (Egypt). 
 120. Id. art. 94 (“The President of the Court has the right to warn judges about violations of their 
obligation and work ethics. The warning can be in oral or written form, after hearing the judges 
defense.”). 
 121. Id. art. 72/1 (“Judges are prohibited from doing any commercial work.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Act No. 81 of 1996 (To Amend Provisions of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, 
Law No. 13 of 1968), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, vol. 19 bis, 22 May 1996, art. 494 (Egypt). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
2017] Reform of Judicial Accountability in Egypt 75 
nonjudicial work.129 The CPL does not regulate such civil liability of 
judges and prosecutors.130 Despite this, judges and prosecutors enjoy 
comprehensive immunity for their nonjudicial actions.131 The JID has 
developed certain practices for nonjudicial civil liability.132 This policy 
occupies a middle ground between criminal and disciplinary 
accountability, but judges enjoy nonjudicial civil immunity.133 On the one 
hand, the JID must express its consent for civil procedures to be launched 
against the nonjudicial civil actions of judges.134 On the other hand, the 
JID cannot take any civil action against a judge.135 If the JID believes that 
there is nonjudicial civil liability, it will transfer the case to the competent 
civil court.136 The court will then hear from all the parties, including the 
judge.137 In other cases, if the JID cannot find any cause for taking 
nonjudicial civil action, the JID will not transfer the case to the competent 
civil court.138 As a result, the plaintiff in the nonjudicial civil case will not 
have his or her case heard. 
Nonjudicial civil liability jeopardizes trust in the judiciary in general 
and in judges specifically. Judges shall not enjoy any civil privilege from 
their personal behavior.139 It is legally unacceptable to add an extra judicial 
barrier with the aim of protecting certain classes in society. If a plaintiff 
claims that a judge has refrained from paying rent, the plaintiff must first 
resort to the JID to obtain its approval to sue the judge. The JID has thus 
imposed an extrajudicial procedure on such plaintiffs.140 Neither the CPL 
nor the JAL regulates nonjudicial civil liability. The practice of the JID, 
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however, has helped to develop a form of immunity for judges. As a result, 
it must be reformed to abolish nonjudicial civil immunity. 
2. Procedures 
a. Political Accountability Procedures 
Accountability procedures differ according to the nature of the 
judicial violation: political, criminal, disciplinary, or civil. For political 
accountability procedures, Article 73 of the JAL identifies two forms of 
political participation by judges.141 First, judges are banned from 
participating in politics.142 Political participation is not identified by the 
JAL in detail, particularly with regard to related procedures and 
consequences for violators.143 However, the JID considers political 
accountability to be part of disciplinary accountability for the procedures; 
it applies the same rules to the disciplinary accountability procedures.144 
Second, judges may not run for any parliamentary elections of regional or 
political organizations unless they resign from their position.145 Article 73 
of the JAL regulates the procedures and rights of judges and prosecutors 
who resign to run for parliamentary elections.146 Therefore, a legislative 
gap exists regarding the procedures for political accountability of judges 
and prosecutors because the procedures and consequences for a judge or 
prosecutor who participates in politics are not clearly identified or defined 
in the JAL. 
b. Disciplinary Accountability Procedures 
For disciplinary accountability procedures, the chairperson of the 
primary court is the competent authority to initiate disciplinary actions 
against judges, while the district attorney of the PPO is the competent 
authority for prosecutors.147 There are several levels in disciplinary 
accountability procedures, starting with a verbal warning to the violator 
(judge or prosecutor), which can then escalate to a written notice if the 
violation is more serious or frequent. 148 
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In a first-instance violation, the chairperson of the primary court or 
the district attorney issues a verbal notice or private admonition to the 
violator.149 They are entitled to issue such a notice if the judge or the 
prosecutor “violate[d] their job obligations, or requirements of their 
job.”150 However, the law’s definitions of job obligations and job 
requirements are not clear. 151 Because a major challenge arising from 
verbal notice is that it opens the door to arbitrary decisions, clear 
definitions of these terms are needed. 
In a second-instance violation, if the verbal notice proved 
insufficient, the violator receives a written notice.152 If the district attorney 
or the chairperson believes that the violator was not deterred by the 
warnings, they raise the issue in a complaint addressed to the JID at the 
MoJ.153 Otherwise, the JID calls on the violator, whether a judge or 
prosecutor, to go to the JID headquarters for further investigation.154 
Investigations are handled by judicial inspectors of a rank higher than the 
rank of the judge or the prosecutor.155 
The JID is the competent authority that holds judges’ records and 
files as a reference for their promotion or transfer.156 It is also the 
competent authority for investigating all disciplinary actions, except for 
verbal notices.157 The disciplinary commission may not take any punitive 
action unless the disciplinary procedures were initiated by the JID. 158 The 
Minister of Justice nominates all the judges who work in the JID to look 
into violations committed by other judges.159 Any nominated judge must 
be of a rank that is either equal or senior to the violating judge.160 If the 
violator is a judge at the Court of Appeal or at the Court of Cassation, the 
nominated judge must hold the rank of vice president of the Court of 
Cassation or president at the Court of Appeal. 161 If the violator is a 
member of the primary court, the investigator shall be a judge at the Court 
of Appeal or the Court of Cassation.162 
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Written notice is considered a harsher form of warning for three 
reasons. First, while verbal notice does not affect the professional 
development of a judge or prosecutor, a written notice is a blemish on the 
judge’s competency. 163 Second, a written notice is documented in the file 
of the judge or the prosecutor until his or her retirement, while a verbal 
notice is not mentioned in any record. 164 Third, the Minister of Justice or 
the Deputy Attorney General issues a written notice, while only the 
chairperson of the court or the district attorney gives a verbal notice. 165 
If the violator continues to commit a further infringement after 
receiving written notice, the JID will proceed with a disciplinary case in 
front of the Disciplinary Commission.166 The procedures are the same as 
the procedures for verbal and written notices.167 The chairperson of the 
primary court or the district attorney will notify the violator of his or her 
violation, and the violator will present his or her case.168 The JID then 
transfers the case to the Disciplinary Commission.169 
The aim of the Disciplinary Commission is to impeach the 
violator.170 The Commission consists of the three most senior justices of 
the Court of Appeal, the two most senior vice presidents of the Court of 
Cassation, and the two most senior justices of the Court of Appeal.171 This 
configuration depends mainly on the seniority of the judges of both the 
Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation.172 In the event that a senior-
ranking judge has an issue attending the Commission, he is replaced by 
the next in command.173 Thus, if the second most senior vice president in 
the Court of Cassation is unable to attend, he is replaced by the third most 
senior vice president of the Court of Cassation.174 
The proceedings of the Disciplinary Commission are the same as that 
of a trial process.175 While the defendant presents his defense, the Attorney 
General presents the people’s claim against the judge.176 Each party 
presents its case to the Commission.177 During the trial, the judge has the 
right to have a public defender, as well as a judge willing to represent him 
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at the trial.178 Unlike the general rule of public trials, proceedings of the 
trial are closed, while the session announcing the final verdict is public.179 
c. Criminal Accountability Procedures 
The JAL includes rules on two types of criminal accountability 
procedures. The first is Flagrante Delicto. 180 This happens when the judge 
or the prosecutor is caught in the act of committing the misdemeanor. 181 
This is mentioned in the same section as judicial immunity.182 Judges and 
prosecutors cannot be arrested unless they are caught while committing 
the crime.183 The Commission determines whether the judge or prosecutor 
should be kept in custody or released with or without bail.184 Additionally, 
the Commission must hear the defendant upon request by the defense 
council. 185 
The second type of procedure takes place when there is “irrefutable 
and conclusive evidence” of the misdemeanor.186 This type of procedure 
combines both criminal and disciplinary procedures.187 For the criminal 
procedures, the Commission suspends the violator from continuing to 
exercise his judicial duties until the criminal court issues its final 
judgment.188 It is worth noting that criminal procedures against the violator 
do not necessarily lead to impeachment.189 The disciplinary procedures are 
a separate process, unrelated to criminal procedures.190 Once the criminal 
procedures have concluded, the Commission begins its impeachment 
proceedings.191 Further, the acquittal does not imply exemption from 
disciplinary procedures.192 The Disciplinary Commission will still have to 
decide on the impeachment, forced resignation, or acquittal of the judge 
or prosecutor.193 
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d. Civil Accountability Procedures 
The JAL does not regulate civil accountability procedures. These 
procedures have, however, been developed by the JID.194 The JID’s policy 
of civil accountability occupies a middle ground between the criminal 
accountability procedures and the disciplinary accountability 
procedures.195 The JID adds one requirement, namely the acceptance of 
the JID to proceed with the accountability procedures against the 
violator.196 The JID has to decide either to proceed with the civil case or 
to dismiss it. In the first case, the plaintiff can resort to the court of law to 
present his or her case against the violator. 197 In the second case, the court 
will not hear the case.198 The plaintiff cannot proceed to the court of law 
without the permission of the JID because the court will refuse to hear the 
case on the grounds of judicial immunity. 199 In both cases, the JID cannot 
impeach or force the violator to resign. 200 As a result, nonjudicial civil 
liability adds a procedural burden to litigation against judges. 
3. Disciplinary Actions 
The JAL does not impose specific sanctions for political, criminal, 
or civil accountability. This has resulted in two issues. First, it has forced 
the JID and the SJC to use disciplinary sanctions as an alternative option. 
The JID and the SJC have established their right to determine suitable 
disciplinary sanctions for political, criminal, or civil violations.201 Second, 
the JID and the SJC have developed policies regarding political, criminal, 
and civil accountability that are not reflected in the JAL. The process of 
forced resignation is an example of such a policy: violators are forced to 
resign before initial criminal or disciplinary procedures even commence. 
202 
The JAL differentiates between disciplinary sanctions and reasons 
for ending disciplinary procedures. Both of these are forms of disciplinary 
sanctions. Nonetheless, there are three differences between the two types. 
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First, disciplinary sanctions are imposed solely by the SJC.203 The violator, 
however, may decide to end disciplinary procedures at any stage through 
voluntary retirement or resignation.204 Second, disciplinary sanctions 
result in supplementary sanctions, such as not being granted a retirement 
salary.205 On the other hand, ending disciplinary procedures aims to 
provide the judge or the prosecutor with an opportunity to avoid 
supplementary sanctions.206 The violator can still have his or her end-of-
service financial rewards and salaries.207 Third, disciplinary sanctions can 
result in exclusion from the Bar and the practice of law for impeached 
judges.208 The violator can resort to terminating the disciplinary 
procedures in order to join the Bar. 209 The Bar Association denies its 
membership to impeached judges. 210 Hence, judges under disciplinary 
procedures prefer to resort to end disciplinary procedures. 
First, disciplinary sanctions involve impeachment or reprimand and 
admonition.211 In terms of impeachment, the JAL considers this as either 
recidivist or harsh punishment.212 In recidivist cases, the violator already 
has a record of disciplinary reprimand or admonition. The Disciplinary 
Commission uses this record as a basis for impeachment.213 As for using 
impeachment as a harsh punishment, the Commission uses impeachment 
directly, even if the violator lacks a track record of disciplinary 
sanctions.214 The Minister of Justice must transfer the impeachment 
decision to the President of the Republic.215 The President then delivers 
the impeachment in the form of a presidential decree.216 Finally, the 
Commission Committee can decide whether to transfer the violator to 
nonjudicial work.217 
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In terms of reprimand and admonition, the JAL does not identify 
specific violations for which a primary court chairperson or the JID issues 
a reprimand or an admonition.218 The JID and the Committee have 
discretion to determine what sanction is appropriate based on the violator’s 
behavior.219 This practice facilitates impartiality and arbitrariness. The 
chairperson of the primary court can issue a notice of violation against 
certain members, while refraining from doing so against those who align 
with the government.220 
Second, reasons for terminating disciplinary procedures are the 
resignation or retirement of the judge or the prosecutor. These reasons are 
an alternative to the disciplinary sanctions. This bargaining sanction is 
mentioned in Article 104 of the JAL.221 In the case of retirement, it 
terminates the work contract, thereby also leading to the termination of the 
disciplinary procedures.222 A violator who has reached the age of seventy 
is immune from any disciplinary sanctions. 223 Resignation is an option for 
two reasons. First, judges usually resort to resignation rather than facing 
impeachment, for fear of shame within the judicial community.224 Second, 
one of the consequences of impeachment procedures is the suspension of 
a pension. 225 For this reason, if the JID finds strong incriminating evidence 
against a judge, it offers him the option of resigning (rather than facing 
impeachment) so that he can benefit from his pension plan. 226 
B. Accountability of the Judiciary 
The JAL does not recognize the collective responsibility of the 
judiciary as an institution, except in the case of political participation. 
Article 73/2 bans courts from declaring their political opinion.227 The 
demand for judicial accountability is a sacrosanct issue in the Egyptian 
judiciary. This is due to four reasons. 
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First, the Egyptian judiciary propagates itself as a protector of 
rights.228 A journalist or writer who meddles in judicial matters or 
comments on judgments, 229 however, is subject to criminal prosecution 
for interfering in judicial matters or for insulting the judiciary.230 
Furthermore, political participation of the judiciary in past years, 
specifically the 2005 and 2012 elections, has raised the question of public 
trust in the judiciary as an institution.231 Many judges have made 
statements against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) regime, the Mubarak 
regime, or the 2013 Coup by handing down harsh sentences for nonlethal 
protests.232 The issue became more complicated after the establishment of 
special courts to place members of the MB on trial.233 This occurred after 
several judges refused to preside in trials against members of the MB.234 
Second, the current rule of the Minister of Justice is ambivalent. 235 
The successive Ministers of Justice are former senior judges. 236 Even 
though they are members of the Cabinet, they still use their former 
status.237 All the senior public officials working in the MoJ are judges, who 
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are on secondment from the judiciary. 238 Moreover, before the JAL 
amendment in 2006, the Minister of Justice had the ultimate right to 
supervise judges and courts. 239 In 2006, the new JAL amendment limited 
this right to only the administrative supervision of the courts, which is 
limited only to court employees. 240 Currently, the real effective authority 
of the MoJ is its authority over the JID. 241 As a result, a redefinition of the 
authority of the Minister of Justice, the MoJ, and the SJC should have been 
addressed before transferring the authority of the MoJ to the SJC. 
Third, the clear lack of a checks and balances system between the 
judiciary and the other authorities raises the question of to whom the 
judiciary is accountable.242 Egypt’s Constitution makes the judiciary 
accountable to itself.243 This raises the question of how to make the 
judiciary accountable to more than just itself, like in the US.244 The JAL 
ensures that the JID is under the full supervision of the MoJ. 245 However, 
current proposals lean toward transferring the MoJ’s authority to the SJC. 
246 On the one hand, this proposal is based on the fact the MoJ has a history 
of misusing the accountability procedures.247 On the other hand, this 
proposal would give accountability authority to an unaccountable 
authority—the SJC.248 As a result, this would lead to a situation where 
“absolute power corrupts absolutely.”249 
Fourth, the Attorney General and the PPO were members of the 
executive and judicial authorities until 2006.250 They used to be under the 
direct supervision of the Minister of Justice.251 In 2006, that article was 
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amended to limit the supervision over the PPO to the Attorney General.252 
In 2014, the Constitution made both the Attorney General and the PPO 
members of the judiciary only.253 In addition, the Constitution eliminated 
the authority of the President to appoint the Attorney General.254 
Currently, the SJC has the sole discretion to appoint the Attorney 
General.255 Hence, the pure judicial nature of the Attorney General 
illustrates the lack of a checks and balances system between the judiciary, 
the legislative, and the executive authorities. 
III. THE CURRENT CHALLENGES REGARDING JUDICIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN EGYPT 
A. Accountability of Judges 
1. The New Policy of Forced Resignation of Judges 
Recently, the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, the President 
of the SJC, and the President of the State Council have exhibited new legal 
behavior against judges who have committed serious offenses, such as 
bribery or getting involved with drugs. This behavior aims to protect the 
image of the judiciary. It involves requesting that the judge resign before 
the start of any criminal or disciplinary procedures.256 This is not yet a 
judicial policy. The JID does not publish the disciplinary procedures 
against judges or prosecutors, as highlighted in two recent major cases. 
In the first case, a judge was caught smuggling 68 kilograms of 
cannabis in November 2016.257 The judge used his judicial immunity to 
pass through security checks at the tunnel connecting Cairo to the Sinai 
Peninsula. 258 While the judge’s car was passing through, a police dog 
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barked at it.259 This led police officers to search the car. 260 The judge was 
arrested, and the Minister of Justice requested that he resign from his 
position. 261 Hence, this resignation deprived the judge of all his legal 
immunity.262 
In the second case, the Secretary General of the State Council was 
charged as an accomplice in a bribery case involving 150 million Egyptian 
Pounds in December 2016.263 The case was publicized when the head of 
the procurement department of the State Council was caught taking a 
bribe. 264 The Administrative Control Authority (ACA) taped the bribery, 
upon which the employee (the head of the procurement department) 
agreed to cooperate with the investigation authority. 265 He directed them 
to the Secretary General of the State Council, who had supported all 
bribery transactions. 266 The ACA presented the information to the 
Attorney General, who went to meet with the President of the State 
Council.267 After a long discussion, they requested that the Secretary 
General resign.268 The Secretary General was later arrested and brought to 
the ACA headquarters. 269 After a long day of investigation, he was 
detained in solitary confinement. 270When they went to conclude the 
investigation the next day, they found that he had committed suicide.271 
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Cleansing the judiciary of corrupt members is not a good enough 
reason to violate the law. The Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, 
the President of the SJC, and the President of the State Council clearly 
violated these judges’ rights. The seriousness of the two crimes (drug 
smuggling and bribery) does not justify violating the JAL procedures. In 
these two incidents, both judges were asked to resign.272 These requests 
violated JAL mandates.273 Specifically, requesting a judge to resign before 
the start of any criminal procedures or disciplinary procedures violates the 
rights stipulated in the Constitution.274 The Minister of Justice, the 
Attorney General, the SJC, and the State Council illegally forced the two 
judges to resign.275 Such action from them would go without holding them 
accountable. As a result, this raises the question of the institution’s 
accountability regarding the head of the judicial institution. 
2. Political Participation 
There must be a clear definition of political participation and the ban 
against judges becoming involved in politics. Judges in the United States 
are able to express their political opinion.276 Freedom of expression is not 
only reflected in their personal lives, but also in their judgments. 277Judges 
are accountable to the people on both a professional and a personal level.278 
While the definition of judicial accountability is not clear, it is always 
connected to either a judicial decision or judicial performance in 
general.279 
In Egypt, Professor Rifaat Fodah argues that every division of the 
state has the right to express its political views.280 The only exception to 
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this rule is the judicial authority.281 Article 73 of the JAL prohibits courts 
and judges from any form of political participation.282 Supporting political 
parties jeopardizes judicial neutrality. 283 Thus, the ban aims to sustain the 
neutrality of the judiciary in political disputes. 
The JID distinguishes between two types of political participation. 
While the JID denounces political participation by left-wing judges, it 
leaves political participation by right-wing judges unpunished.284 This 
political discrepancy started after the 2013 Coup.285 During 2012 and 
2013, judges were divided into three main parties.286 The first was the 
neutral party.287 They did not adopt any political position during the 
political turmoil following the success of the MB presidential candidate.288 
This group was the smallest group in the judiciary at that time.289 
The second party opposed the MB in various political statements in 
a way that benefitted Mubarak’s regime.290 These official statements and 
press conferences were published in the public media, denouncing the MB 
and their politics.291 The leader of this faction was Judge Al-Zend, who 
was the President of the Judges’ Club and later became the Minister of 
Justice.292 The major position of this group came after the promulgation of 
the 2012 Constitutional Declaration.293 The Declaration instigated three 
major points of contention by these judges.294 First, the Declaration 
reopened the investigation and prosecutions in acts committed against the 
revolutionaries.295 Second, the Declaration offered legal immunity from 
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any judicial supervision to all legal acts of the President, especially the 
Constitutional Declaration.296 It also offered immunity to the Constituent 
Assembly from judicial supervision.297 Third, the Declaration limited the 
Attorney General’s term of office to four years.298 As a result, Al-Zend’s 
judges issued statements against the executive and legislative bodies.299 
By the same token, the MB, several executives, and members of the 
legislative authority have issued counter-statements against the 
judiciary.300 
The third party was a minority of judges, who supported the MB 
against the 2013 Coup.301 These judges subsequently signed a petition.302 
The judges who signed this petition were later called “judges of 
Raba’a.”303 After the 2013 Coup, some of the JIM members signed a 
document condemning the Coup.304 They also publicized this document in 
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Raba’a Al-Adawiya Square, the center of the MB sit-in following the 
Coup.305 Currently, the JID and the SJC have issued disciplinary 
procedures as well as impeachment proceedings against several of the 
judges of Raba’a. 306 The JID and the SJC believe that the judges of Raba’a 
have clearly violated Article 73 regarding the ban against political 
participation. 307 On the other hand, even though Al-Zend’s judges also 
participated in politics during this time, the JID and the SJC have left them 
unpunished. 308 The JID and the SJC view Al-Zend’s judges as protecting 
judicial independence from the brutal aggression of the executive.309 
Hence, they do not consider their participation in politics a violation of 
Article 73. 
3. Lack of Transparency 
The judiciary often withholds necessary information concerning 
judicial administration from the public. Each circuit and prosecution 
district office issues its own statistics. 310 This data is sent monthly to the 
MoJ and the Attorney General. 311 None of this data is made available to 
the public.312 There is no public institution within the judiciary that 
releases judicial data in reference to the number or types of cases. 313 This 
is a violation of Article 68/1 of the Constitution, which regulates access to 
information and official documents. 314 
The lack of transparency within the judiciary takes on three forms. 
First, the Attorney General has the ultimate authority to ban media 
coverage in certain cases to protect the confidentiality of those involved.315 
Between 2013 and 2015, the Attorney General banned the publication of 
                                                     
COMMISSION OF JURISTS (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.icj.org/egypt-arbitrary-and-unfair-removal-of-
judges-must-be-reversed/ [https://perma.cc/2VHU-9ZWE]. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 73 
(Egypt). 
 308. Al Hajjaji, supra note 90, at 394. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. There is no available data on the Ministry of Justice website. See Bawabat Wazaret al-
A’del, Johorayat Misr Al-Arabyah (2016), http://www.jp.gov.eg/ar/Default.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/9RKY-QW44]. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 68/1. (“Information, 
data, statistics and official documents are owned by the people. Disclosure thereof from various 
sources is a right guaranteed by the state to all citizens. The state shall provide and make them available 
to citizens with transparency.”). 
 315. Egypt: Freedom of the Press 2016, FREEDOM HOUSE (2016), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/egypt [https://perma.cc/S79X-H9TC] (noting 
Egypt’s press freedom status as “not free”). 
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fifteen cases, all related to police or judicial violations.316 This right is 
criticized, given that the Attorney General is empowered with an authority 
that is undisputed and unverified by any national independent bodies. 317 
Second, judges and prosecutors prepare statistics related to their 
districts, which are subsequently sent to both the MoJ and the Attorney 
General.318 They believe that the publication of such data leads to 
interference with the administration of justice, which is mainly the 
responsibility of the MoJ.319 Third, neither the judiciary nor the PPO 
appoints a public speaker to address the public with judicial and public 
concerns.320 The judiciary believes it is the legal elite321 and disregards 
public demands for information.322 As a result, it is rare to come across 
public statements regarding popular cases from either the judiciary or the 
PPO. 323 
There are two reasons for this lack of transparency in the judiciary: 
a lack of legal responsibility and a lack of political responsibility. In terms 
of legal responsibility, even though there is a constitutional mandate to 
ensure the transparency of state agencies, the JAL and the judicial practice 
take a stand against this right. 324 On the one hand, the Constitution 
stipulates that there should be a forum in which citizens can file complaints 
                                                     
 316. Ahmed al-Bahnasawi, Qadaia hazr alnashr monzo 30 July le-elrashowh aljansayah, AL 
WATAN NEWS (July 2015), http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/777221 [https:// 
perma.cc/SJD6-KDBJ]. 
 317. Id. 
 318. The website of the Ministry of Justice does not include any information regarding the 
ministry, except news of the Minister of Justice and his assistance. See generally Al Hajjaji, supra 
note 90. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Deputy Attorney General Mustafa Suleiman held only one public press conference. This 
press conference was about the murder of the Italian researcher Giulio Regeni. See Regeni Murder: 
Egypt Denies Italy Phone Record Request, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36007876 [https://perma.cc/F2C3-3ZB6]. 
 321. Nancy Elshami, The Egyptian Judiciary: Current Divisions and Historical Contexts, 
MUFTAH (Jan. 9, 2013), http://muftah.org/the-egyptian-judiciary-current-divisions-and-historical-
contexts/#.V_J4TfTV6Xk [https://perma.cc/KE8Z-JWXP]. 
 322. Mustafa Suleiman stated “such conference is the first of its kind. It is not to answer any 
question regarding the investigations, rather it is to answer questions related to PPO’s delegates visit 
to Italy.” To view full press conference see Mutamar Suhafi le-na’eb al’am almusa’d, OnE, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 9, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enHZ1up5a5U. 
 323. The Supreme Judicial Council has issued a decision to ban all judges and prosecutors from 
making public statements, which includes writing on social media. The violators of the decision are 
subject to disciplinary proceedings. Egypt’s SJC Warns Judges of Publishing News Related to 
Judiciary Affairs on Social Media, AHRAM ONLINE (Jan 9, 2017), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/254733.aspx [https://perma.cc/J72M-GU7K]; see also Alaa Turki, 
Egypt: SJC Warns Judges Against Sensitive Social Media Posts, SADA ALBALAD (Jan. 9, 2017) 
http://en.el-balad.com/2318541 [https://perma.cc/BEE8-275D]. 
 324. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 83 
(Egypt). The article limits the right to sue the judiciary as an institute to judges, prosecutors, and their 
families. 
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regarding access to public data being withheld. 325 It also maintains that 
responsibility must be taken in cases of nonconformity.326 On the other 
hand, the JAL protects the judicial administration from any redress sought 
by the public.327 Members of the public cannot force the judiciary to 
disclose such data. Article 84 of the JAL limits the right to complain 
against judicial administrative decisions, including the request to disclose 
judicial data to judges and prosecutors.328 The Judges’ Circuit at the Cairo 
Court of Appeal, which is responsible for all cases relating to the 
annulment of judicial administrative decisions, will not hear any cases 
related to a constitutional mandate unless the plaintiff is a judge or 
prosecutor. 329 Members of the public are not able to seek legal redress 
before the Judges’ Circuit, even if they have been harmed by the judicial 
administrative decision.330 Consequently, the current formulation of the 
JAL constitutes an obstacle to enforcing the constitutional right, resulting 
in its inapplicability. 
In terms of political responsibility, no responsibility falls to either the 
judiciary or the Attorney General when it comes to publishing judicial 
data.331 This is due to two reasons. First, there is no consultation of the 
public in the appointment process of the SJC, the Minister of Justice, or 
the Attorney General.332 As far as the SJC is concerned, all of its seven 
                                                     
 325. Article 68/2 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt provides “[t]he law shall 
organize rules for obtaining such, rules of availability and confidentiality, rules for depositing and 
preserving such, and lodging complaints against refusals to grant access thereto. The law shall specify 
penalties for withholding information or deliberately providing false information.” CONSTITUTION OF 
THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 68/2 
 326. Id. 
 327. MOHAMMED NOUR FARHAT & ALI SADEK, ARAB CTR. FOR THE DEV. OF THE RULE OF LAW 
& INTEGRITY, REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY IN EGYPT: SECOND DRAFT, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Egypt/Egypt_FinalReportP2S4_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZNL-
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 328. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 84 
(Egypt). This law outlines the process of seeking legal redress against judicial administrative 
decisions, judicial appointment, judicial transfer, judicial organization, regulation, and finances of the 
courts. 
 329. Id. 
 330. This applies to the candidates who got rejected from being appointed to the judiciary. These 
candidates try to litigate such cases at the civil circuit in the Cairo Court of Appeal; the circuit would 
rule that they are not competent personnel for such cases based on Article 83 of the Judicial Authority 
Law. 
 331. The Public Prosecution Office has never held any public press conferences, except a sole 
press conference in 2016. This conference was related to the homicide of the Italian PhD student Giulio 
Regeni. The Assistant Attorney General stated that “this is the first public conference. It is not to 
answer any question regarding the investigations, rather it is to answer question related to the Public 
Prosecution Office delegates visit to Italy in March 2016.” Mutamar Suhafi le-na’eb al’am almusa’d, 
OnE, YOUTUBE (Apr. 9, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enHZ1up5a5U. 
 332. Id. 
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members are appointed based on the principle of seniority.333 Second, 
there is an issue of sensitivity among the executives in dealing with the 
SJC, the Minister of Justice, and the Attorney General. While the MoJ is 
a member of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister cannot request that data be 
made available to the public.334 This is because the Cabinet fears executive 
interference in judicial affairs.335 As a result, both legal and political 
responsibilities of the judiciary must be established. The JAL can work on 
establishing the legal responsibility of the judiciary. The political 
responsibility is part of judicial legitimacy, which also needs to be 
addressed. 
4. Current Endeavors to Transfer the JID to the SJC 
One of the major requests of judges is to transfer the JID from the 
MoJ to the SJC. The JID is a subdivision of the MoJ and a strong tool in 
controlling the judiciary. Before 2006, the Minister of Justice was the only 
competent authority that nominated the JID chairperson, who also works 
as a Deputy to the Minister of Justice.336 In 2006, a new amendment was 
introduced requiring SJC acceptance of the proposed JID chairperson 
candidate.337 This amendment was a great disappointment to judges, as 
they sought a full transfer of the JID from the Minister of Justice to the 
SJC.338 This is why the new amendment is not considered a real reform. 
Transferring the JID to the SJC failed after the 2011 Revolution. 339 
In 2012, the Minister of Justice, Judge Ahmed Mikky, sent a formal letter 
to the SJC requesting a factual transfer of the JID.340 He intended for this 
                                                     
 333. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 
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his assistance, and members of the department of judicial inspection is done by the Minister of Justice, 
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 338. Al-Khudayri, supra note 246, at 47–48. 
 339. Minister of Justice Ahmed Mikky requested a full transfer of the JID to the SJC. However, 
this request was denied by the SJC. Letter from Minister of Justice Mikky, to Chief Justice of the 
Court of Cassation and Supreme Judicial Council (2012), http://new.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?nwsId= 
167356&secid=1&vid=2 [https://perma.cc/Y3BZ-Y6BL]. 
 340. The letter states the following: 
The Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation and the Chairman of the SJC . . . . Since I have 
the honor to be a member of the Judiciary, I shared with my colleagues the utmost necessity 
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factual transfer to potentially lead to the legal transfer of the JID to the 
SJC. 341 This incident was the only significant attempt at transferring the 
JID from the MoJ to the SJC. 342 Judge Mikky’s request, however, was 
denied. 343 The SJC claimed that such a transfer required a legislative 
amendment to the JAL, instead of a ministerial decision.344 This was a 
golden opportunity for the judiciary to carry out a factual transfer of the 
JID. Most of the judges felt betrayed by the SJC.345 It was very difficult at 
that time to amend the JAL due to existing political hurdles. As a 
consequence, there was a predominant feeling of fear among judges that 
the SJC would become another arm of the executive. 346 
Egypt’s Constitution has led to increasing judicial instability. Any 
proposal for judicial reform has been suspended during the period of 
President Al-Sisi.347 The status quo is considered the best position for any 
regime to maintain strong influence over judicial decisions, while giving 
more authority over the judiciary to the MoJ.348 With a clear lack of 
separation of powers in contemporary Egypt, it is hard to say there is an 
impartial and independent mechanism that ensures judicial accountability. 
B. Accountability of the Judicial Institute 
1. Accountability of the Minister of Justice 
The ambivalence regarding the position of the Minister of Justice—
in other words, whether it is a purely executive authority or somewhere 
between the executive and the judiciary—has given rise to the term 
                                                     
to transfer JID from the Ministry of Justice to the SJC . . . . As per our last meeting, I heard 
that you would nominate Judge Zaghloul al-Balushi to be the new chairperson of the JID. 
I have not only agreed with your nomination, but also starting today I would like to inform 
you the transfer of the JID to the SJC is now in effect. I wish also to ask your acceptance 
of his nomination to be Assistant to the MoJ until the promulgation of a new law, which 
would attach the JID to your Council. Please accept my sincere regards to the SJC, the new 
chairperson of the JID, and all our colleagues. 
Id. 
 341. Mohamed al-Sanhuri, al-Qada Al’al: lan nosherf ‘la al-Tafish down qanwan, AL MASRY 
AL YOUM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/157553 
[https://perma.cc/FUD6-8H6A]. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. The only reform al-Sisi’s parliament has proposed is to abolish the seniority principle in the 
appointment of the President of the Court of Cassation and the State Council. This proposal was met 
with great opposition from both the President and the Council. Sayed Elhadidi, Egypt’s Parliament, 
Judiciary Face Off Against Each Other, EGYPT PLUS (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/egypt-parliament-law-judiciary-independence.html. 
 348. Id. 
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“sovereign ministry.”349 This term does not have a specific legal definition. 
Rather, it denotes the practice followed before the formulation of the 2014 
Constitution.350 The President of the Republic has the right to appoint 
ministers for “sovereign ministries” upon consultation with the Prime 
Minister.351 Moreover, in July 2013, the President of the Republic made 
an attempt to appoint Judge Mohamed Mahdi, a former judge at the 
Egyptian State Council and the ICTY, as the Minister of Justice.352 This 
suggestion was rejected by most of the ordinary court judges.353 One of 
the judges said “the club, as well as the judges, will boycott the ministry 
if Mahdi is chosen to be the Minister of Justice.”354 The president was then 
forced to appoint him as the Minister of Transitional Justice.355 
In May 2015, ex-Minister of Justice, Judge Mahfouz Saber, was 
asked during a television interview whether “the son of a garbage collector 
stood any chance of being appointed as a public prosecutor.”356 He replied:  
                                                     
 349. The term “sovereign ministry” includes the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. 
The appointment of these ministers is taken directly from the President of the Republic. Article 234 
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 350. Id. 
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art. 146. 
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http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/former-judges [https://perma.cc/78TR-WPRW]. 
 353. Shimaa Rasid, Masdar Qadai: Al-Bablawi Rastaqr Mabdiean ‘ala Ta’yean Adel Abdel 
Haid Wazearn Lel’adl, SHOROUK NEWS (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=18072013&id=2296c089-52e1-4c46-ba16-
5ecad13b0a52 [https://perma.cc/28MP-7DMD]. 
 354. Al qodah yad’own ljam’yah ghair ‘adayah ‘tradan ‘la almahdi waziran lel’dl, KADY 
ONLINE (July 16, 2013), https://kadyonline.com/?p=7522 [https://perma.cc/D6AE-MEZY]. Judges 
and prosecutors announced that they refused the appointment of State Council ex-judge Amin al-
Mahdi as the Minister of Justice; see also Mahmoud Housin, Shabab ALqodah Totalab Be’qd Jam’yah 
“omomyah Taraeh Letasadi Leta’yean Al-Mahdi Wazearn Lel-’adl, MASRESS (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.masress.com/youm7/1164107 [https://perma.cc/LSH5-AJDM]. 
 355. Ahmed Morsy, Transition Justice: Egypt’s Way Forward, MIDDLE EAST INST. (July 26, 
2013), http://www.mei.edu/content/transitional-justice-egypts-way-forward [https://perma.cc/4AHL-
N37T]. See also Who’s Who: Egypt’s Full Interim Cabinet, AHRAM ONLINE (July 17, 2013), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/76609/Egypt/0/Whos-who-Egypts-full-interim-
Cabinet.aspx [https://perma.cc/52AF-95BR]. 
 356. Albayt baytak – wazear al-’adl ya yomkan an ya’mal ibn ‘amal anzafah be-qada, YOUTUBE 
(May 10, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7H8mPdTJUWw. 
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[T]he judge should be from a proper social class . . . with all due 
respect to garbage collectors, and to those below or above 
him . . . a proper environment, and a good social class are 
necessary . . . I am not saying the judge should be an 
aristocrat . . . I am saying the class should not be very low.357  
As a result of this statement, Saber resigned from office a week later. 358 
In March 2016, the ex-Minister of Justice and ex-president of the 
Judges’ Club, Judge Ahmed Al-Zend, made several controversial 
statements upon his appointment as the Minister of Justice. 359 The two 
most controversial were about neutralizing MB opponents without a trial 
and involved insulting the prophet Mohammed. In the first statement, he 
was answering a question about what he thought of the killing of the 
terrorists in Sinai without a trial. His response was as follows: 
If the armed forces have responded hastily and killed 40 of those 
terrorist extremists . . . the armed forces will spare no effort in 
avenging their deaths in a way that will satisfy our fury . . . I 
believe 400,000 are not enough for our martyrs . . . . Personally, 
the fire in my heart will not die out until at least 10,000 radicals 
are killed for every martyr[.]360 
In the second incident, Al-Zend responded to the question on the 
imprisonment of journalists who insulted him in their newspapers. He said 
“if jail was not created for those people, then for whom? . . . I would 
imprison anyone who violates the law, even if it is the Prophet 
Mohammed—Peace be upon him.”361 Al-Zend later voiced his regret at 
having made such a statement.362 The Prime Minister, however, asked Al-
Zend to resign as a result of his controversial statement.363 Al-Zend refused 
to comply with the Prime Minister’s request.364 He believed that he could 
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not be removed from office for this type of verbal mistake.365 The issue 
was raised with President Al-Sisi, who ordered his removal from the 
Cabinet. 366 Hence, Al Sisi appointed a new Minister of Justice.367 
2. Accountability of the SJC 
There are three issues closely related to the accountability of the SJC. 
First, the Constitution and the JAL lack any legal rule regarding SJC 
accountability.368 It has been argued that members of the SJC hold their 
position for only one judicial year, starting in October each year.369 
However, the continuous attempts from the executive to override the 
judiciary mandate the existence of a strong SJC. 370 This strength would be 
used to stop such attempts.371 The weakness of the SJC’s position leads to 
a stronger role of the Judges’ Club as the sponsor of the judiciary against 
the executive authority, even though the main—and supposedly sole—role 
of the Club is to offer services to its members.372 As a result, the call for 
increased authority of the SJC must include concrete accountability rules. 
Second, SJC members are elected neither internally (internal judges’ 
elections) nor externally (public elections). They are appointed based on 
their seniority, except for the position of the Attorney General.373 The 
president of the SJC is the most senior member at the Court of 
Cassation.374 The two other members from the Court of Cassation are the 
                                                     
with such wording. This can be clearly seen in the incident of the woman from Bani Makhzum who 
committed theft during the prophet’s time. When Usama bin Zaid (former adopted child of the prophet 
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second and the third most senior.375 The president of the Cairo Court of 
Appeal and the two most senior judges at the Court of Appeal are also 
members.376 Previously, the 1943 Judicial Independence Law (JIL) 
required at least two elected members in the composition of the SJC.377 
The JIL was amended in less than two months after the 1952 Coup.378 
Third, SJC members are potential candidates for executive positions 
after their retirement. The hope of holding a position after retirement 
prevents members of the SJC from taking any aggressive measures against 
the executive authority, for fear of being deprived of senior, post-
retirement positions. From 2011 to 2016, eight judges have assumed the 
position of Minister of Justice.379 Six out of the eight ministers were 
members of the SJC.380 These judges who were members of the SJC and 
later became the Minister of Justice are: 
1. Adel Abdel Hamid (ex-president of Court of Cassation, appointed 
as Minister of Justice from December 2011 to August 2012 (first term)),381 
2. Ahmed Mikky (ex-vice president of Court of Cassation, appointed 
as Minister of Justice August from 2012 to May 2013),382 
3. Adel Abdel Hamid (ex-president of Court of Cassation, appointed 
as Minister of Justice from July 2013 to February 2014 (second term),383 
4. Nair Othman (ex-vice president of Court of Cassation, appointed 
as Minister of Justice from February 2014 to June 2014),384 
5. Mahfouz Saber (ex-president of Alexandria Court of Appeal, 
appointed as Minister of Justice from June 2014 to May 2015),385 and 
                                                     
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
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6. Mohamed Hossam (ex-president of Court of Cassation, appointed 
as Minister of Justice from March 2016 to the present).386 
3. Accountability of the Attorney General 
The appointment of the Attorney General has undergone three stages. 
In the first two stages, the nature of the position of the Attorney General 
was either executive only, 387 or a mixture between judicial and executive 
powers. 388 During these two periods, both the legal and the political 
accountability of the Attorney General was left to the executive authority 
to handle. The first stage was from 1972 to 2005.389 The Attorney General 
was under direct supervision of the Minister of Justice for both judicial 
and administrative work. 390 The second stage occurred after the JAL 
reform in 2005, when the Attorney General position became independent 
from the Minister of Justice. 391 The appointment of the Attorney General 
was still at the discretion of the President of the Republic.392 In these two 
stages, any legal or political responsibilities of the Attorney General were 
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directly referred to the executive, despite the mixed nature of the 
position.393 
In contrast, the position of the Attorney General in the third stage has 
raised many questions regarding legal and political accountability.394 The 
third and current stage started in 2014.395 The 2014 Constitution 
transferred the appointment authority of the Attorney General from the 
President of the Republic to the SJC.396 This transfer turned a blind eye to 
the accountability issue regarding the Attorney General.397 The JAL has 
not tackled this issue of accountability. Its philosophy is that the Attorney 
General is a member of the executive authority, or at least enjoys an 
authority of mixed nature (executive and judicial).398 
Any form of legal or political accountability of the Attorney General 
is not a matter of discussion for several reasons. First, the term of the 
Attorney General is currently for a limited period.399 Previously, the 
appointment term of the Attorney General was unlimited, which is based 
on ex-Attorney General Abdel-Majid Mahmoud, who was appointed from 
2006 to 2012.400 Currently, the Constitution limits the duration of the 
Attorney General to only four years.401 Therefore, the Constitution and the 
JAL do not address the impeachment process or the replacement of the 
Attorney General. 
Second, the impeachment or removal of the Attorney General is 
directly connected to the replacement of the ex-Attorney General Abdel-
Majid Mahmoud (2006–2012). The impeachment of the Attorney General 
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was one of the most pressing issues after the 2011 Revolution.402 During 
the period between 1992 and 2006, Mahmoud was the district attorney of 
the National Security Prosecution Office.403 In 2006, Mahmoud was 
appointed as Attorney General by ex-President Mubarak.404 
After the success of the Revolution in 2011, it was difficult for the 
MB to keep Mahmoud in his position.405 The MB believed that he was a 
tool of Mubarak’s regime and that he himself used to persecute MB 
members.406 The MB offered Mahmoud the opportunity to leave his 
position in return for an appointment as ambassador to the Vatican.407 
Even though he initially accepted the offer, Mahmoud later refused to 
leave his position.408 Following this incident, ex-President Morsi issued 
the 2012 Constitutional Declaration to limit the appointment period of the 
Attorney General.409 Mahmoud—as well as the whole judiciary—refuted 
the Declaration, based on Article 67 of the JAL.410 That article bans the 
dismissal of judges from their office.411 As a consequence, judges and 
prosecutors engaged in several strikes against the MB and its Declaration 
until the 2013 Coup.412 
IV. PROPOSED REFORM FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN EGYPT 
A. Proposed Reform for Accountability of Judges 
1. Clear Criteria for Non-Disciplinary Behavior 
The unclear criteria of what is considered disciplinary and what is 
not renders the judicial accountability process vague. It opens the door for 
the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, and the Disciplinary 
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Commission to get rid of noncompliant judges. This can be rectified in 
three steps. 
First, an independent and democratic institution should be the 
competent authority for impeachment and investigation of disciplinary 
actions. At the federal level in the United States, the Constitution mandates 
the “good behavior” of the judiciary.413 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
settled several principles in this regard.414 In Nixon v. United States, the 
Court indicated that the Senate had the sole discretion to choose its 
procedures.415 The chief judge of the federal district court was prosecuted 
and sentenced to prison for false statements before a federal grand jury.416 
After hearings in the Senate, senators voted in favor of Nixon’s conviction 
and impeachment.417 The establishment of an independent institution is, 
therefore, discussed in detail in the last part of this Article by highlighting 
a proposed reform for the accountability of the judiciary.418 
Second, the application of the JAL violates the principle of Nulla 
Poena Sine Lege (“no penalty without a law”).419 This principle has two 
dimensions. The first dimension is that the law must clearly state the illegal 
behavior of a judge or prosecutor, which is subject to disciplinary 
procedures.420 For example, even though the CPL did not include personal 
                                                     
 413. “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court . . . judges . 
. . shall hold their offices . . . and [shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 414. Alex Long, “Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again”: Judicial Conduct 
Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2003). 
 415. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 416. Id. The Constitution states “the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. 
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall 
be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, 
cl. 6. 
 417. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226. The Court also maintained Hamilton’s position on judicial 
accountability: 
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting 
impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for mal-conduct by the House of 
Representatives, and tried by the senate, and if convicted, may be dismissed from office 
and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point, which is 
consistent with the necessary independence of judicial character, and is the only one which 
we find in our constitution in respect to our own judges. 
Id. at 235 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphasis in original)). 
 418. People v. Bonnetta, 205 P.3d 279 (2009). The Supreme Court of California maintained in 
Bonnetta that “[t]he purposes for requiring a trial court to state its reasons for a dismissal are (1) to 
promote judicial accountability so as to protect the public interest in not allowing improper or corrupt 
dismissals.” Id. at 288. 
 419. Stefan Glaser, Nullum Grimen Sine Lege, 24 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 3D SERIES 29, 34 
(1942). 
 420. Id. 
2017] Reform of Judicial Accountability in Egypt 103 
conduct as grounds for disciplinary action, the practice of the JID 
considers conduct as part of disciplinary behavior.421 In France, 
disciplinary action is not limited to intentional professional negligence,422 
but it also includes the private conduct of judges’ in their personal lives.423 
Judges and prosecutors do not represent themselves; they represent the 
institution they belong to: the judiciary. Theft and alcoholism, among 
other acts, constitute a violation of judges’ obligations in private life in 
France.424 Second, the JAL must specify the exact punishment for each 
violation.425 It cannot be left to the authority to determine the suitable 
punishment.426 This occurred when the Disciplinary Commission 
impeached judges and prosecutors who made political statements after the 
2013 Coup.427 
Third, the JAL does not grant judges or prosecutors any form of 
safeguard measures against arbitrary actions by the Disciplinary 
Commission.428 In France, the Constitution and the Judicial Ordinance 
offer judges and prosecutors several safeguards against arbitrary decisions 
or unfair trials. Judges and prosecutors who are charged with disciplinary 
action (defendants) are entitled to full access to evidence and files relevant 
to their cases.429 They are not subject to any form of search or seizure by 
the Committee.430 Judges and prosecutors’ houses and properties are 
protected as part of the immunity endowed upon them.431 
Another example of a French judicial safeguard is that decisions 
taken by the Committee are additionally reviewed by the Conseil d’Etat, 
which is the entity responsible for administrative disputes.432 The 
significance of such a body lies in the integration between the two systems 
of ordinary and administrative courts. It also offers a high level of 
protection against arbitrary decisions. In these cases, the Conseil d’Etat 
acts as a juge de cassation if the defendant is a judge,433 and it acts as a 
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juge de l’excès de pouvoir if the defendant is a prosecutor.434 It reviews 
the legality of the decision and whether it complies with constitutional and 
legal guidelines.435 As a result, these safeguards ensure that sanctions are 
not “clearly disproportionate to the offences.”436 
2.  Transparent Disciplinary Processes 
In Egypt, there is a clear lack of transparent disciplinary processes. 
On a smaller scale, there is no transparent impeachment process. On a 
broader scale, there are no general disciplinary processes. A transparent 
process takes on three forms. Under the first form, the whole process 
should be categorized as a transparent process. An example of a 
transparent disciplinary process can be found in the United Kingdom, 
where there are two aspects of judicial accountability: sacrificial 
accountability and explanatory accountability.437 Sacrificial accountability 
occurs when a judge commits a criminal act.438 Judges are subject to 
criminal investigation by the office of judicial complaints, where the 
violator is later subject to disciplinary sanctions.439 Explanatory 
accountability occurs when the actions of the judge and the reason for his 
or her behavior are investigated.440 The Lord Chief Justice and the Lord 
Chancellor are both responsible for investigating any complaints of this 
type of behavior.441 The Judicial Conduct Investigations Office handles 
these types of complaints.442 It is considered an independent body of the 
judiciary.443 This process is to guarantee public confidence in the process 
of accountability across the United Kingdom. 
Under the second form of a transparent judicial process, the outcome 
of the judicial accountability process is made available to the public in 
order to increase its confidence in the judicial system. In the United 
Kingdom., the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office issues an annual 
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report, which includes the number of complaints received. 444 Between 
2013 and 2014, the number of full- and part-time judiciary members was 
estimated at 36,000, of which 29,000 were magistrates and 7,000 tribunal 
members.445 Out of 2,018 total complaints, fifty-eight cases involved 
formal disciplinary actions.446 Complaints are first screened by the Judicial 
Conduct Investigations Office.447 If the complaint falls within its authority, 
the case is referred to the Office for Judicial Complaints.448 
Under the third form of a transparent judicial process, there must be 
a spokesperson to address the public regarding all matters of judicial 
authority. Judicial affairs are not a national security issue that needs to be 
hidden from the public. In the United Kingdom, the judiciary offers three 
forms of activities: interviews and media briefings; the Lord Chief 
Justice’s review of the administration of justice in courts; and court 
reports.449 As for interviews and media briefings, judges occasionally give 
interviews to the media.450 Since 2008, the Lord Chief Justice’s office has 
published a periodical review of judicial matters.451 The report aims to 
identify issues of major concern to the judiciary and justice 
administration.452 As for court reports, each court must provide an annual 
report on their “performance throughout the year.”453 Hence, Egypt should 
follow in the United Kingdom’s footsteps and have all of its judiciary data 
made public. 
3. Limited Civil and Criminal Accountability 
Judicial immunity aims to protect judges and prosecutors from the 
executive authority.454 However, the judiciary in Egypt has expanded the 
application of judicial immunity to unprecedented instances in an effort to 
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face the authoritarian regime in Egypt.455 The rules of legal immunity need 
to be redefined to reflect their real objective. Criminal immunity must be 
limited to criminal conduct of the judges inside the courtroom.456 It should 
not be extended to include a special status for judges and prosecutors. 
Offering a special status to judges and prosecutors leads to the abuse of 
their powers.457 
Civil immunity is granted to judges to safeguard them against 
damages incurred from their profession.458 This form of immunity is a 
limited immunity.459 However, unlimited civil immunity violates the point 
of civil accountability of judges.460 The JAL should either abolish civil 
immunity of judges for nonjudicial work or ensure that procedures are 
clearly stated in the law. In France, civil liability for a judge for nonjudicial 
work starts with filing a complaint or calling for disciplinary action against 
a judge.461 The plaintiff has to submit a complaint to the national 
ombudsman (médiateur de la République).462 The complaint is first 
reviewed by an ombudsman associate before being taken to the next 
level.463 Therefore, a limited civil liability should be granted to Egyptian 
judges that does not add any procedural burdens to litigation. 
B. Proposed Reform for Judicial Accountability 
1. Reformulation of the SJC 
It has been argued that the authority of the MoJ should be transferred 
to the SJC.464 However, this proposal expands judicial autonomy. This 
proposal implies a transfer of the authority of the MoJ from one judge (the 
Minister of Justice) to seven judges (the SJC).465 Any transfer of authority 
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to the SJC should be done only after its reformulation. The current 
formulation is prejudiced against fair representation of all members of the 
judiciary or judicial ranks and the public. A full public representation in 
the judiciary involves two steps: interim and permanent reforms. The 
interim reform should take between five and ten years. It should aim to 
pave the way for full public participation in judicial administration. During 
this period, not only should the SJC include elected members from the 
judiciary, as was the case before 1952,466 but the new formulation should 
also include senior law professors who represent the public. 
The proposed temporary formulation is as follows: three 
representatives from the primary courts, three representatives from the 
courts of appeal, three representatives from the Court of Cassation, two 
representatives from the junior prosecution, two representatives from the 
senior prosecution (including the Attorney General), and five senior law 
professors chosen from the oldest four law schools (Cairo, Alexandria, 
Assuit, and Ain Shams). The permanent reform should occur at a later 
period, once the judiciary and the public bodies accept the idea of lay 
people, lawyers, and professors in the judicial administration. The 
formulation of the SJC during this period should include elected judges, 
lawyers, prominent public figures, and emeritus professors. The manner 
and method of choosing them should be tackled in separate research 
covering a later period of Egyptian judicial history. 
2. Transfer of the JID to the SJC 
The current proposed amendment is to transfer the JID from the MoJ 
to the SJC.467 It has been argued that there are three merits behind 
relocating this power from the MoJ to the SJC.468 First, this transfer 
achieves judicial independence.469 This advantage, however, is not 
tangible. There is no concept of a multi-party system in the Egyptian 
government and especially in the Minister of Justice position. Ordinary 
court judges never accept a Minister of Justice from the administrative 
judiciary, as was the case with Judge Mahdi,470 who was later appointed 
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as the Minister of Transitional Justice.471 Besides, all members of the JID 
are judges who are on secondment to the department.472 
Second, the Minister of Justice uses the JID to retaliate against 
unwanted judges.473 For example, during the impeachment process of the 
judges of Raba’a, the chairperson of the Impeachment Committee,474 who 
is also the president of the SJC, jailed Judge Awad during the disciplinary 
proceedings for violating the Commission’s order.475 When the rest of the 
Raba’a judges requested the chairperson to step down from the 
Committee, Al-Zend adamantly refused their request.476 As a result, the 
chairperson was both the plaintiff and the judge in the same case. 
Third, the formulation of the Committee is undemocratic. The 
Committee faces a legitimacy dilemma because neither the people nor the 
judges choose its members. The role of the JID in the MoJ is limited to 
investigating violations committed by judges and prosecuting cases before 
the Committee. The Committee is the only authority that has the right to 
impeach a judge. The Committee consists of seven members, six of whom 
are members of the SJC.477 The authority of impeaching a judge therefore 
lies in the hands of the SJC.478 
Moreover, the JID and the Impeachment Committee rules must be 
replaced. The proposed amendment is to establish an Independent 
Impeachment Committee (IIC), as well as transfer the JID to the SJC. 
There are three advantages to adopting such a solution. First, the IIC 
indicates a democratic choice of the impeachment committee members. 
Second, nonjudicial members make significant contributions to the 
accountability process. The choice of these members can be made on a 
seniority basis or by an internal election among judges in selecting these 
lawyers and professors. Third, the transfer of the JID to the SJC must be 
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conditional upon the reformulation of the SJC. The SJC must include 
elected, nonelected, judicial, and nonjudicial members. If the 
reformulation is not adopted and the JID is transferred to the SJC, little 
change would occur. On the contrary, it would be considered a threat to 
judicial independence. Judges can still put up a resistance to the MoJ, as it 
is still subject to political responsibility.479 Judges will not be able to put 
up any resistance to the SJC. The current formulation of the SJC places it 
at a higher level of accountability to both the judiciary and the public. As 
a result, the judges and the public would not be able to fight the 
inconsistency of the decisions of the SJC.480 
3. Reform of the Position of the Minister of Justice 
The current function of the primary court chairperson is that of 
supervising judges. This role must change.481 In Germany, the president of 
the court oversees the work of judges.482 Such supervision cannot conflict 
with their independence. 483 There are two conditions attached to this type 
of supervision. First, judges shall be subject to the supervision as long as 
it does not conflict with their independence.484 Second, if a judge 
“contends that a supervisory measure detracts from his independence, a 
court shall give a ruling in compliance with this Act.” 485 A clear 
distinction between the judiciary and the MoJ should be in force. The MoJ 
shall not be chosen from the SJC or any newly retired judge. The work of 
the MoJ contradicts with judicial work. Appointment of a recent former 
judge increases the notion that this position is a reward for compliance 
with the executive authority. To avoid such a hypothesis, a time delay of 
five years must be introduced. No judge should take on an executive 
position after his or her retirement until five years has passed. This period 
will function as a safeguard against attempts to buy the loyalty and 
allegiance of judges—including SJC members. 
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CONCLUSION 
The 2013 Military Coup succeeded in suspending all calls for judicial 
reform.486 The Egyptian judicial system, however, faces an interconnected 
web of serious problems. This Article attempts to answer the question of 
why judicial institutions are in need of reform. It lists the judicial failures 
in facing serious economic, social, legal, and political challenges. The 
contemporary challenges facing Egypt are not secluded from the judicial 
challenges. Legal activists, including lawyers, judges, and NGO members, 
have long called for reform. This Article endeavors to shed light on the 
importance of judicial reform, especially with regard to judicial 
accountability in Egypt. The inability of the judiciary to respond to 
ongoing challenges continues to prevent the progress of society as a whole. 
Strong governmental institutions need an independent and accountable 
judiciary to reinforce the law. 
This Article makes four recommendations. First, the judiciary must 
adopt clear rules of political participation and issue sanctions for 
violations. It is unacceptable that rules banning political participation 
apply only to opponents of the political regime. The JID must apply rules 
equally; they are not a tool of retribution against political rivals. Second, 
the judiciary must be excluded from the electoral process to fulfill its main 
role of protecting the legality of the process instead of protecting the 
process itself. Third, the judiciary must accept the political responsibility 
of its actions. It is unacceptable for an independent judiciary to be above 
political participation. Fourth, a new formulation of the Supreme Judicial 
Council must be introduced to reflect a democratic and accountable 
judiciary to the public because the public is the source of its authority. 
                                                     
 486. Al Hajjaji, supra note 16 at 283.  
